



(English)
Exercises in Modern Kerala History
(Historical Study)

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Cover Design: K. Balakrishnan

First Published March 2012

Printed at M. P. Paul Smaraka

Offset Printing Press (SPCS), Kottayam

Price Rs. 150.00

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COLONIAL STATE AND EARLY NATIVE RESISTANCE IN MALABAR

M.P. Mujeebu Rehiman

The nature of colonial state and people's response towards the British in the province of Malabar in its early phase is rather an unexplored area of historical research. Though a lot more works have been come about in relation to the establishment of British rule in Malabar, many questions remain there still unaddressed. The present paper is primarily an attempt to re-appraise the predispositions of the New Cambridge School of historians that the British administration in India was the result of 'collaboration' or it was materialised by the 'consent' of its people. Interestingly, a careful perusal of the colonial archival documents with regard to Malabar and other places of south India except in some princely states stand against the theory of 'collaboration' and 'consent,' on the basis of the fact that people had challenged the colonial governance from the very beginning itself. The paper seeks to explore the imbroglio faced by the colonial state during the period mentioned and it also explores the project of resistance against the colonial establishment by Keralavarma Pazhassi raja, in association with the natives including the tribal leaders like Thalakkal Chandu, Edachena Kunkan and the Mappila rebel chiefs such as Unni Mootha Moopan, Attan Gurukkal, Chemban Pokker etc. The paper strongly argues that there was an insurgency situation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Malabar and due to which the existence of colonial state in Malabar itself was at peril in its initial phase.

Though the collaboration theory is almost rejected by the scholars of Indian history, the spectres of which are found reverberated in the academic and general discourses with regard to colonialism in India. The first section of this paper is dedicated to a careful reading of texts from Anil Seal and C. A. Bayly, the vanguards of collaboration theory, which may lead us to a logical conclusion with regard to resistance movements against the colonial state. For Anil Seal, "...Self-interest, not self- abnegation, brought them to the side of the Raj. This argument was all the more true of the Presidencies of Madras, Bengal and Bombay. Here the British power had been firm before its extension to upper India; here during the crisis of 1857 not a dog had barked[emphasis added]; here there were districts and cities undergoing much more economic and social change than any parts of Hindustan proper. Indeed this system of control by less than by force extended far beyond the areas of payments and street lighting. All the hills and jungles of Orissa were ruled by less than a hundred Englishmen. Evidently there were large parts of British India where autocracy was tempered by consent."¹ [emphasis added]. Here, the author is enthusiastic to propagate the theory of collaboration and consent by ignoring the instances of revolts before and after the great revolt of 1857 in India. He actually conceals the facts by stating that the British administration in the Presidencies was firm compared to Hindustan. His argument, 'during the crisis of 1857 not a dog had barked' is of course the rhetoric of an ambitious and blind colonialist who formulate theory by selective episodes. He seems to be deaf while the dogs were alarmingly barking throughout at least a century. If one surveys the early history of colonialism in Madras presidency, to which Malabar province was transferred from Bombay in 1800, facts are sufficient to dismiss the theory of consent and of collaboration. Of course, Bayly's ideas may be seen as the sequel to the earlier version of the theory. He writes, "...The boundary between 'revolt' and 'collaboration' was often very faint, defined more by the prejudices of individual officials or by the internal factional politics of Indian states and villages than by any clear predisposition towards anti-

colonial resistance.”² This statement is political with an intention to belittle every endeavours of resistance from the part of the Indian people. Here I would like to submit that the experiences from Malabar stand against the generalisation and boundary between revolts and collaboration at any stage was not faint. Indeed, some individuals might have collaborated with the Company for their aims, but it was simply aberration.

In an effort to establish collaboration theory, Anil Seal vociferously writes, “there were other Indians standing outside the hierarchy of officials, whose support was of greater political importance to the Raj. During the first half of the century the British had often met resistance from landowners and notables, the traditional leaders of their localities, who were cut down for their pains...For the most part, Indian notables were moribund, and their resistance was scattered and spasmodic. Some of this old political elite had been blown into historical footnotes by the cannons of the redcoats, others had been shrunk into administrative agents by the pressures of British rule.”³ According to Seal, “...Most of these magnates became ineluctably committed to the Raj, although at the district level some of the local notables were more ambiguous collaborators. They had much to gain from collaboration.”⁴ But the review of episodes of anti British resistance in Malabar helps us to understand how far the collaboration theory is contradictory with history.

Before entering into the experiences of Malabar, I have to present Bayly’s own statement to counter pose Seal’s arguments. It reads, “Conflicts over the Company’s claim to total dominance continued to occur across the country up to two generations after conquest. The British consistently saw any form resistance as the work of ‘contumacious’ zamindars or rebel chieftains.”⁵ Indeed this confession though seems to be a mistake, stands close to the hard realities of early phase of anti colonial struggles. In the case of Malabar, initial opposition to the Company was from the part of local chiefs and the Rajas. Rajas were in expectation of reinstating to their previous positions as rulers of the land after the Treaty of Srirangapatnam in 1792. Instead, the

Company emerged as a political entity and attempted to degrade them to the status of 'Bengal zamindars'. This was one of the significant steps taken by the British towards establishment of colonial state in Malabar.⁶ As a result the company compelled the rajas to sign the treaties approving legitimate authority of the colonial state. From September 1792, a policy of intervention was favoured, one which was to assure E.E.I.C of a monopoly of pepper.⁷ Directions to use a mild language, five months of confusion in the affairs of Malabar Rajas are enough to think of the Company's lack of confidence or power to pursue a colonial policy on the land.

Contrary to the earlier policy of use of 'mild language,' the Company in September 1792 started a policy of intervention and use of power towards the rajas. However, the local rulers were not ready to accept the proposal of temporary treaties with the company as revenue collectors and they claimed the legal status as the rulers. It was in this context that Mr. Farmer and Dow insisted the Company to maintain the power of the Rajas and leave the administration of the country in their hands accordingly.⁸ They argued that the Rajas would rule the province far more effectively than the English could do. The Commissioners were conscious of the fact that the British alone could not police the country side in Malabar and the administration through the mediation of the rajas was necessary. The proposals echoed the so-called Cornwallis system, which had proposed to compromise with the zamindars among other local potentates.⁹ Instead of accepting the recommendations, the Company decided to intimidate the rajas by reminding them of revisit of Tipu Sultan in the absence of a mighty power on the land. The Commissioners were directed to make a temporary scheme of internal administration which might continue until the Governor General had sufficient knowledge of the country to warrant the introduction of a permanent system. As they found on 22nd April, 1792, the local rulers had retrieved their previous principalities, the Commissioners were in favour of maintaining the power of the rajas and leaving the administration of the country into their hands.¹⁰

Accordingly, they decided to enter into annual agreements with the native chiefs in which Pazhassiraja Keralavarma, the ruler of Kottayam was also taken part. Moreover the British could convince the chiefs that they could be get rid off from the heavy taxation of Tippu Sultan.

But Pazhassiraja Keralavarma challenged the Company administration when it started to raise share of revenue from the next year itself. After a prolonged discussion, the Raja had agreed firstly, the entire pepper production [at least 500 kantis] was to be handed over to the British at a rate of Rs.90/- per kanti; Secondly, a sum of 20,000 rupees either in cash or natural produce was to be paid in two installments one year in arrears.¹¹ But in the coming year, the Commissioners unilaterally made amendments to the previous treaty, according to which the Raja was compelled to pay Rs. 55, 000/- along with at least 700-800 kantis of pepper.¹² The Commission also compelled him to abolish the custom of purushanthuram and avoid acceptance of all gifts and presents. But the Raja refused to accept all these unjust impositions.

Considering his attitude towards the British, the Joint Commissioners termed Pazhassi raja as the 'most intractable and unreasonable of the Rajas'.¹³ Pazhassi became the staunch opponent of the British by 1795. He was on the war front since then, and pursued until his death in the year 1805. His career as a rebel can be divided into three phases as from 1795 to 1800; from 1800 to 1801 and the last phase from 1802 to 1805. As far as the Company in its formative phase was concerned, such a prolonged confrontation was demoralising. A series of internal and external problems associated with Company cropped up during the Pazhassi insurrections sustained for a decade. Within a short span of time, Pazhassi and his associates such as Thalakkal Chandu, Edachena Kunkan, Kaiteri Ambu, Kannavathu Nambiar, Kaiteri Kumaran, Kaiteri Eman, Elampulayan Kunhan, Puttan Veettil Rairu, Meena Koran, Shekhara Variar, Paitalott Nair, Mylodan Kanchan Nambiar and many other Nair and tribal warriors started guerrilla warfare throughout the entire Wayanad forest, which created panic in

the British circles. In various fights in the jungle British lost many commanders and the raja expected the retaliation. In such a context Pazhassi Raja sought support from Tipu Sultan and he offered ammunition; he stationed 6000 "Carnatics" [kannada soldiers] in Karkankotta [the present corresponding place is to be identified] and also delivered 2000 horses. Pazhassi Raja was also to receive fresh supplies of ammunitions in cases of emergency.¹⁴ Besides, Pazhassi's men had contacted the rebels of Dindigal through the mediation of the Mappila rebels of Eranad.¹⁵ In addition to this, many wings of the Mappila rebels had rallied together with Pazhassi, taking staunch anti-British position (which will be discussed later).

The rebel factor had prompted the British to contemplate on restructuring in the state craft and administration in Malabar. The most important among which, (contrary to the official explanation of administrative convenience as the causal factor) was transfer of Malabar province from Bombay to Madras Presidency. Secondly, the Company was forced to cancel trade monopoly within a few years of its administration. And the protracted warfare created much casualties to a number of British commanders as well as the soldiers. Moreover several collectors and officials were withdrawn or resigned without completion of their terms since they failed to maintain law and order. For example, William Mc Leod, who was appointed as principal collector was resigned taking responsibility of the deterioration of peace in the country. Mc. Leod's order to disarm Malabar (Arms Act) in 1802¹⁶ and the new tax policy and governor's declaration of martial law of 1803¹⁷ provoked the rebels and it culminated in the capture of Kozhikkode prison by the rebels. He was succeeded by Rickards and the popular upheavals in Kalliat and Anjarakkandi led to his own removal and appointment of Thomas Warden as the new Collector. All these events substantiate the fact that the rebellion was almost triumphant to dismantle the administrative wing of the Company. Interestingly, even in the initial phase of the 'disturbances' that the Joint Commissioners

had recommended the closure of the Tellicherry Factory alleging increase in expenditure.¹⁸

The Mappila folk of Malabar have a luminous tradition of incessant warfare of defence against the European powers since the arrival of the Portuguese. There is a large corpus of anti-imperialist literature by Kerala Muslims belong to 15th and 16th centuries.¹⁹ Their heroism and vigour are transferred to generations in the form of malappattu, Patappattu etc. As Duarte Barbosa, the Portuguese traveller, rightly observes, the Mappilas north to Dharmatom in early decades of the sixteenth century had rebelled against anything stood injurious to them and often the king (Kolathiri) had to threaten or conciliate to put them under control.²⁰ Likewise the author of a sixteenth century Arabic chronicle, Tuhafat-al -Mujahidin had exhorted the Mappilas to fight against the Portuguese and consequently led to fierce battles.²¹ Politically, there were several attempts to establish political leverage by the Mammalis of Kannur (the Arakkal Muslim royal family) in the sixteenth century. By 18th century, there was a confrontation between the Mappilas and Para Nambi, the local potentate of Malappuram. (The popular Malappuram nercha is observed annually in memory of this incident.) In 1786 Athan Gurukal, the local Mappila chief of Manjeri, had revolted against the oppressive revenue system introduced by Tipu Sultan. It is said that the Mappilas had assisted the Coorgs and Ravivarma of Samutiri kovilakam in one of his revolts against Tipu in the year 1788. The Mappila presence in Pazhassi revolts is rarely highlighted by the historians. There are ample references to Elampilasseri Unni Mutta Muppan, Athan Gurukkal and Chemban Pokker, who had led their anti-colonial struggles independently as well as in association with Pazhassi Raja.²² They had succeeded in maintaining their sway over their own domains of Eranad, and Valluvanad. It is a fact that just before Malabar was conquered by the British and even after that Unni Mutta had used to claim the sole authority in eastern regions of Valluvanad. He had used to beat nakara(a drum) in his name and offered prayers personally in mosques.²³ And when the colonial state

started to exert its coercive power over the local people in the form of revenue reforms and legality, the Mappilas staunchly resisted it. The result was a series of Mappila revolts in South Malabar in the 19th century culminating in the Malabar Rebellion of 1921.

The British records refer to the interior agricultural Mappilas as 'outrageous' and 'ruffians', as they staunchly resisted the British. The Joint Commissioners called the rebels as 'Jungle Mappilas' or 'Jungle and robbing Mappilas'.²⁴ According to the British, the coastal Mappilas were active in trade and were well behaved; but their fellow religionists who lived in the interior were incessantly engaged in marauding expeditions.²⁵ The Mappila revolts, for the British, were 'Moplah disturbances'. The most prominent leaders with a considerable popular support were, Unni Mutta Muppan of Elampulasserri, Attan Gurukkal of Manjeri, Hydros Kutty of Eranad etc. They raised their strong voices of resentment towards the unjust revenues and newly introduced forms of justice in Malabar. Records like Diaries especially those belong to the close of 18th century and beginning of 19th century recurrently discuss the problem in detail. To quote Joint Commissioners, "...They never would voluntarily or quietly submit to pay the revenue...."²⁶ Those revolts in Southern districts, especially in Eranad, Valluvanad, Cheranad and adjoining areas practically eliminated the Company's government in those parts. The words of Walter Ever, a former member of the Court of Directors, may spread light to the intensity of the rebellions. He writes, "from Tanoure to Chowghat, the road from Calicut to Cochin upward 30 miles there is no government than in the deserts of Saudi Arabia".²⁷ The major objective of those rebellions actually was to retain the pre-British socio-economic system. It is doubtful whether there were traces of "social banditry" as some scholars have formulated.²⁸ Obviously, the Muppanns, the erstwhile revenue administrators under Tipu Sultan, had hindered the British from collecting revenue. It should be pointed out that some of these Muppanns were previously great opponents of Tipu's invasions in Malabar.

The Company was conscious of the 'depredations of jungle Mappilas' and they received fresh complaints of their revolts from the very date of the announcement of the establishment of their administration (18th March 1793) in the province. It was in the context of these revolts that Mr. Farmer submitted his opinion to transfer the collections of their districts "to the Company, which seemed the only way of reconciling and attaching them to the government". Maj. Dow's proposal in this regard was that "their [Mappilas] collections should be entrusted to men of their own tribe under proper restrictions." As a part of formulating the measures to conciliate the rebels, it was agreed to give a general amnesty to Nairs and Mappilas for their all past offences up to 1st February 1793.²⁹

However the measures found no results and the British received fresh reports of violence by Hydros, a rebel (robber, to the English) in the districts of Vellattiri and Vettattunad, whose men according to the British, had committed "several inhuman murders and daring robberies besides alarming that part of the country in general sending threatening letters to extort money and provisions from the plan of their houses burnt and themselves put to death".³⁰ Major Dow was deputed to induce Hydros to bring him to Calicut but on the way he escaped and pursued his acts of violence against the British. Major Dow's project in this regard was "to adopt Tipu's plan by appointing the fittest persons in the different Mappila districts, Moopans or headman of their respective divisions entertaining under such (and placing them under the British superintendent of each jurisdiction) a proportionate number of armed Mappilas to assist in the collection of the revenues and in the preservation of peace and order in the districts." These measures and gestures of the British are sufficient to argue that there was an insurgency situation in Malabar. And the British had formulated policy of both inducement and intimidation varied in accordance with the places and peoples.

When the first violence was reported, the supervisor had attempted to bring the aforementioned Hydros Kutty through the mediation of

khadi (qazi) (the religious head of a particular region) of that part of the country. The khadi informed that it was not at all an easy job. Mr. Stevens, superintendent of the Southern district, reported at the same time that Unni Mootha Muppan was the chief of all Mappila Muppan. He had possessed a fortified house in the jungle, about fourteen miles distant from Cherpulasseri, the seat of the southern superintendent. The British thought, "he may cause to assist in chastising other disturbers of the peace but being himself in reality the secret spring and mover of every disorder."³¹ Unni Mootha had raised stiff resistance to Tipu's army and in 1786-87, Arshad Beg was forced to take him with 100 followers.

Since the prospect of amicable solution was more or less faded, the British were thinking of an armed attack. The offer of a general pardon to the rebellious Mappilas was treated with neglect especially by Unni Mootha, which again created an atmosphere of war. His army was consisted of exclusive Mappilas, several Carnatic sepoy and he had a habit of correspondence with the power above the ghats [probably the Mysore], who had thousands of his dependents.

But as per Maj. Dow's orders, Captain Burchall marched to Unni Moota and after surrounding his fortified place of abode passed almost the entire day in unsuccessfully endeavouring to induce him to come into his camp and return with him to Cherpulasseri. Though fierce battle was held at until the night, Unni Moota escaped when the "moon was going down". Maj. Dow's recommendations with regard to the repressing future depredations were first, to appoint proper persons of their own tribe in conjunction with the government officers, to collect the revenue from them and secondly, to disarm them, as soon as it can be done with safety to prohibit them from going about armed.³²

The British were compelled to make an interim agreement on 8th May 1794 with Unni Mootha Muppan by Maj. Murray³³ with a view to secure peace to the country in his small district of Elampilasseri by offering him an allowance of Rs. 1000/- per annum. But he renewed his pretensions to a share of the revenue and began using black mail.³⁴

Consequently, the supervisor there upon offered a reward of Rs.3000/- for his capture. Capt. Mac. Donald had seized and demolished his stronghold on the forest clad hill of Pandhallur near Malappuram. Later on Unni Mootha Muppan was pardoned and restored to his estate of Elampulasserri. Though he was pardoned the British records speak of his insurgencies in the coming years as well.

Another person who led strong resistance was Athan Gurukkal of Manjeri, who was erstwhile revenue Collector of the Zamorins. When they (he and his father Moideen Kutty Gurukkal) resisted the Mysorean impositions in 1784, they were deported to Srirangapatanam. His father died there. And when the British captured Malabar in 1792, Athan Gurukkal was appointed as the head of police establishment in Eranad.³⁵ But this cordial relation with the British did not last for long. As in the period Tipu of Sultan, the Gurukkal raised protest against the over burden of the collection. During the time of Tipu the land lords were along with Gurukkal because of the high rate of revenue. Likewise, when the British rate of revenue was excessive, he staunchly fought against the British along with other local chiefs. Another reason for the revolts with the British was the British suspicion about Gurukkal's ever increasing influence over the people. In 1799, he absolutely turned against the British as a result of murder of Unni Mootha's brother by the British (Unni Mootha was brother-in-law of Athan Gurukkal). The British version of the very reason for the resistance from the side of Athan Gurukkal was the spirit of revenge for the punishment inflicted by the regular judicial process on the above mentioned relative, Adam Khan, who had been executed for murder.

The coalition of Unni Mootha, Attan Gurukkal and Chemben Pokker became disturbing for the British after an abortive attempt by the Assistant Collector, Mr. Baber to seize Chemban Pokker who had escaped from Palakkad fort. Consequently, Mr. Baber's party was repulsed. The success encouraged Chemben Pokker to make a daring attempt on G. Waddell,³⁶ the southern superintendent, while he was proceeding from Angadippuram to Orampuram [the place is to be

identified], in which attempt Pokker was secretly assisted by Gurukkal, who had been in the Company's service since 1796 as the head of the police in Eranad.

Secret and Political Department Diaries is a collection of very significant primary source which help us to suggest that the British were puzzled by a series of rebellions evinced by the Mappilas. Extensive correspondence between the Malabar Commissioners and the Bombay establishment shed much light on the intensity of those insurrections. Of which, towards the end of the 18th century those operations undertaken by Chemban Pokker and his associates were very severe. It is believed that Pokker fought wars with the British mainly in and around Tamarasseri region.³⁷ The selection of this place may be with a view to associate with Pazhassi Raja's troops and to make a joint attack against the British.

The revenue collections of Kottayam were at a stand-still in consequence of these troubles. In 1800, Col. Wellesley from North wrote to the Commissioners to stop communication with Wayanad with a view to cut off the Pazhassi Raja's supplies. Apart from this, in the context of protracted rebellion, the British decided to transfer the military control of the province of Malabar from the control of Bombay to Madras Government in the year 1800. The official explanation of which, however was the administrative convenience.³⁸ Afterwards, the Malabar Commissioners deputed Major Walker to the Southern districts and upon his report condemning the spirited actions of Messers Baber and Waddell with reference to Mappila bandits Chemban Pokker was pardoned on his giving security for good behaviour³⁹ and Gurukkal was allowed the option of either living on the coast near Calicut or standing his trial for having caused the late troubles.

There were some fierce battle between the British troops and Pazhassi Raja who with armed inhabitants, left the mountains in April 1800 and descended upon the valleys. To the British records, Pazhassi and his men were joined by the peasants of Iruvazhinad and the followers of the Mappila Chief Unni Mootha at Kuttiyadi.⁴⁰ In the meanwhile the Muslim insurgents guided by Athan Gurukkal and Chemben Pokker

took the positions in the Southern region. Until the submission of Pazhassi Raja, the southern Mappila rebels had associated directly or indirectly in his major operations.

Likewise, the Mappila leaders of the North like Chalad Thangal, Haidar Kunhikutty, Elampulan Kunhan, Vavantullan kunhi, Kunhi Moideen Muppan of Elathur (Kurumbranad leader) were close Mappilas associates of Pazhassi Raja in the North. Athi Muppan of Kadathanad had brought not less than 100 Mappilas from South Malabar to assist Pazhassi Raja's force.⁴¹ Interestingly, even the prominent Mappila merchants of Tellicherry, Chovvakkaran Moosa and Mucky, the principal contractors of the British East India Company had contacted the rebels and had supplied rice, gunpowder and other essentials, in exchange of pepper.⁴² When the British enquired about the 'malpractices', they replied that they were not at all aware of whether their agents were in touch with the rebels or not.

Though the British could eliminate Pazhassi Raja and the Mappila rebels, it was no ending of the revolts. The tribals of Wayanad, Kurichias and Paniyars had fought against the British in the coming years. Similarly the Mappila tenants of south Malabar had no other way than revolt. The reinstated feudal lords, janmis were empowered with ownership of land contrary to the customary practice of land control. The impact of revenue laws was disastrous on peasantry. The rural poverty was severely intensified due to the revenue reforms in south Malabar, particularly in Eranad and Valluvanad taluks⁴³. The important causative factor of the peasants' poverty according to Logan was basically the colonial agrarian system, which denied the fixity of tenure, fair rent and free transfer to the tenants. The inferior tenure holders became pauperised—that means, their means of production lost.⁴⁴ According to Kathleen Gough, outbreaks were essentially an economic phenomenon, that they were directly and solely a response to radical changes induced in the agricultural economy of Malabar District by British administration.⁴⁵ "In fact, there is no doubt that British rule substantially

altered the agricultural economy of Malabar District. Land became a marketable commodity, and landholders became land-owners with new rights which they could and did invoke in British courts to coerce their tenants. Yet while these changes helped to trigger some Mappilla outbreaks and influenced the course of others, these incidents were an extremely complicated phenomenon; and none of them was solely the result of economic pressure.⁴⁶ The question of land, religion and identity became before Mappilas as intensity.⁴⁷ The result of which was grave as far as the British were concerned. From 1836 to 1919 there were 31 major revolts in which 336 people became martyrs. The number of targeted enemies amounted to 78⁴⁸.

Conclusion

The collaboration theory of the new Cambridge scholars such as Anil Seal, Bayly and many others is both nonsensical and baseless. What they argued in relation to South India or at least in the case of Malabar, proved to be wrong. The intensity and high frequency of popular revolts from the establishment of the British power is a marker of contradiction. Of course, there were some sections of people who assisted the British to get instant benefits however subsequently they had to experience great losses. It cannot be called as collaboration; collaboration is possible between the equals. Whatever be the nature and objectives of Pazhassi revolts, the spirit was anti-British, though which was not nationalist. Nationalism as pointed out earlier was a later phenomenon. Secondly the early struggles of Mappilas which are not part of the recorded anti-colonial history of Malabar, demand special attention. The general perception is that only the Mappilas of south Malabar were rebellious. But the records are sufficient to argue that the people like Chalad Thangal, Haidar Kunhikutty, Elampulan Kunhan, Vavantullan kunhi, Kunhi Moideen Muppan of Elathur (Kurumbranad leader), Athi Muppan of Kadathanad were close Mappilas associates of Pazhassi Raja in the North and were leaders of rebellions. And finally, the British state in its early phase was very meek. The existence

of the state was in question in many occasions due to the challenges raised by the native rebels. So there is no scope to argue for the theory of collaboration in the case of colonialism in Malabar.

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27. Wlateral Ewer to Henry Dundas, 17th July, 1797, Home Misc. Vol. 438 (India Office Library and Records, London), pp. 194-95, cited in K.K.N. Kurup, Modern Kerala Studies in Social and Agrarian Relations, New Delhi, 1988, p. 63, fn. 6.
28. Prof. K.K.N. Kurup argues that there were some traces of social banditry in those revolts, which has to be subjected to further enquiries.
29. R. J. C., vol. III, pp. 254-255.

30. Ibid., pp. 255-56.
31. Ibid., p. 329.
32. Ibid., p. 339.
33. Logan, Treaties, ii. LXXVIII.
34. Logan, Malabar, p. 501.
35. Ibid., p. 522.
36. S.P.D.D., No. 88, 1800, pp. 732-37.
37. K. Rajayyan, South Indian Rebellion, the First War of Independence, 1800-1801, Mysore, 1971, p.181.
38. S. P.D.D., No. 99, 1800.39 Logan, Treaties, ii. CCXVI.
40. Board of Revenue, 4th May, 1801, Proceedings, vol. 282, pp. 5265-6, cited in K. Rajayyan, op. cit., p.175.
41. K. K. N. Kurup, op. cit., p.101.
42. A.P. Abdurahiman, 'Palassi Rebellion: The Role of Coastal Merchants', Journal of Kerala Studies, vol. I, no. 2&3, Jan. 1974, pp. 295-98.
43. KK.N. Kurup," The Early Mappila Uprisings", in his The Legacy of Islam, Kannur, 2006, p.63
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45. Kathleen Gough, "Peasant Resistance and Revolt in South India," Pacific Affairs, vol. XVI, no.4 (Winter 1968-69), pp. 526-54.
46. Stephen F. Dale, "The Mappilla Outbreaks: Ideology and Social Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Kerala," The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 35, no. 1 (Nov., 1975), pp. 85-97.
47. K.K.N. Kurup, op.cit., p.64.
48. For a detailed table of year, place, martyrs and list of the targeted, see Conrad Wood, The Moplah Rebellion and its Genesis, Delhi, 1987, pp.1114.